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Abstract This paper employs a large-scale, individual-
level, panel dataset to analyse the effect of EU accession on
the probability of out-migration on the part of Hungarian
physicians and dentists between 2003 and 2011. The study
uses event history modelling and competing risk models.
The results show that EU accession did not at the time
affect the probability of out-migration while after the end
of the transitional period of restrictions on the free move-
ment of labour from the new EU member states to Austria
and Germany, the probability of doctors’ migration
increased considerably. Relative wages and peer pressure
also exercise a significant role in the out-migration deci-
sions of young medical doctors. We also find that more
than half of those medical doctors who left the country
during the observation period returned some time later. The
data furthermore suggest a massive flow of doctors to
domestic jobs outside the health care system.
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Introduction
The aim of this study is to analyse how European Union
(EU) accession has affected the emigration of medical
doctors. This is increasingly the object of keen attention in
many European countries because it places additional
pressure on an already constrained workforce [1–3].
Demand for medical doctors continues to exceed supply for
reasons such as increased training costs, an aging popula-
tion, the development of medical technology and growing
degree of specialisation [4–6]. Furthermore, increasing
pressure at work has resulted in medical doctors leaving
clinical practice for less stressful types of jobs, e.g. medical
advisor or medical sales representative [7]. The European
Commission predicts that the EU will face a shortage of
230,000 physicians and a further shortage of 150,000
dentists, pharmacists and physiotherapists by 2020 if
existing workforce problems are not addressed [8].
All EU member states are losing medical doctors, not
only the Central and Eastern European new member states
(EU-101), but also the EU-152 countries. However, unlike
the EU-10 countries, many EU-15 countries are the desti-
nation of migration by health professionals from other
nations [3, 9–13]. The share of foreign trained and foreign
born doctors on average is lower in the EU10 than in EU15
countries, (in 2012–2014 it was 4.5 versus 13.4% and 6
versus 13.9%, respectively3) [14]. In Hungary the share of
foreign trained doctors is relatively high compared to other
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EU10 countries. It was 7.6% in 2012–2014, but the share of
foreign born doctors was as low as in other EU10 countries,
at 2.1% in the same period [14]. As the EU-10 countries are
currently not competitive with the old EU member states in
terms of wages, working conditions and career prospects,
EU accession amplified fears in the Central and Eastern
European new member states that accession may facilitate
the movement of physicians from these countries to other
parts of the Union, and that out-migration could intensify
shortages of doctors in these countries.
Several projects (MoHProf,4 PROMeTHEUS5) and
studies [3, 9–13, 17–20] have examined the migration of
medical doctors in Europe. These studies concluded that
post-accession outflows from the Central and Eastern
European new member states have been lower than
expected, but they also found that more recent data show
some increase in outward migration [21]. Nevertheless,
most of these studies emphasise that there is a lack of
reliable data on out-migration (e.g. in most countries, the
only data source available to estimate outflows is ‘inten-
tion-to-leave’ data, that is, the number of applications for
certificates of recognition of diplomas or survey data ask-
ing about medical doctors’ intention to work abroad. These
data have limited reliability in relation to the movement
trends of doctors because not everyone who applies for
certificates or who is planning to leave their home country
actually leaves. Also, individuals may apply more than
once, leading to overestimates of actual flows. Further-
more, not all countries systematically request these cer-
tificates, and this may result in the underestimation of
migration [2, 16, 17, 22, 23]). In addition to the difficulties
of the measurement of outward migration, we know far less
about how return migration has changed. The few studies
that have investigated return migration used survey data to
assess the magnitude of it [e.g. 24].
Our research explores a unique, large-scale, individual-
level, panel data set that allows us to follow out-migration,
attrition and other employment status changes of Hungar-
ian medical doctors at the individual level on a monthly
basis between 2003 and 2011. This study may supplement
previous research as it analysed actual changes in out-mi-
gration and employment status of medical doctors. In
addition, our sample also made the observation of the
return migration of physicians during the observation per-
iod possible. The paper further provides estimations on
how the probability of return migration has changed
between 2003 and 2011.
Data
The base data set is a large, merged, longitudinal dataset
covering 50% of Hungary’s population aged 5–73 in 2003.
The data contains information from registers of the Pension
Directorate, the Tax Office, the Health Insurance Fund, the
Public Employment Service and the Office of Education.
From this source sample, a medical doctors’ subsample
was created. All individuals were included in the medical
doctors’ subsample whose occupation code was ‘‘medical
doctor, general practitioner’’, ‘‘medical doctor, specialist
doctor’’ or ‘‘medical doctor, dentist’’ according to the
Hungarian Occupational Classification system for at least 1
month between January 2003 and December 2011. Each
datum in the sample is followed until December 2011 or
exit from the social security system (for reasons of death or
permanent emigration). The maximum number of obser-
vations for one individual is 108 months. The unit of
observation is the monthly status of individuals.
Our data contain information month by month on the
labour market status of the individual; whether the indi-
vidual was working for the given month in Hungary; if so,
what his/her occupation code was; also the question of
whether the person was studying, in receipt of benefits such
as old-age pension, disability benefit, or child care allow-
ance and social security benefits, unemployment insurance
benefit, or unemployment assistance. We also have data on
demographics (date of birth, gender), the region of resi-
dence and the labour income of the individual. The income
from employment contains any informal payments the
individual doctor listed in their tax statement. The use of
informal health payments or ‘‘thank-you money’’ to gain
access to health care is widespread in Hungary, as in most
Eastern European countries [e.g., 25, 26]. Although doctors
have to declare informal payments in their tax statements,
tax evasion is also widespread, and most tax statements
include only a part of the real amount of such payments.
We could not address the problem of this hidden income in
this study.
We have data for 18,266 individuals. The number of
working doctors varied between 9594 and 11,415 persons
in the different observed months, and of these, 2933–3331
were general practitioners, 5462–6899 specialist doctors,
and 1024–1469 dentists. (Summary statistics for the vari-
ables used in estimation are presented in Appendix 1
Table 7). There are some biases in the sample. First, as we
do not have data on medical graduates who have never
worked in the Hungarian health system, they are not
included in the sample. Other data on medical graduates
indicates high outward migration for graduates. For
example, about 40% of those who finished their studies
between 2007 and 2010 have not yet registered in the
4 MoHProf reviewed the trends in international migration of health
workers in 25 countries around the world, with a focus on migration
within, to and from the EU [15].
5 PROMeTHEUS, looked at health professional mobility and health
systems of 17 countries in Europe [16].
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system [27]. As we could not include medical graduates in
our analysis, our results give a lower bound estimate on the
out-migration of Hungarian doctors. Secondly, we could
not identify those individuals as medical doctors who
worked in managerial positions in the health sector for the
whole observation period, because they did not have a
‘‘medical doctor’’ occupation code at any time, so we could
not determine whether they were medical doctors.
With the help of the detailed information on labour
market status and other data concerning the individuals,
five status groups could be distinguished: (1) those working
as a physician or dentist in Hungary, (2) out-migrated, (3)
exited the profession (attrition), (4) exited employment
(related to inactivity, unemployment), or (5) died. We used
the following scheme to classify the observations in rela-
tion to these groups.
1. Working as medical doctor
To this group, we classified those individuals who had a
‘‘medical doctor, general practitioner’’, ‘‘medical doctor,
specialist doctor’’ or ‘‘medical doctor, dentist’’ occupa-
tion code in the Hungarian classification of occupations
code system in the given month. Also, individuals whose
professional code was missing in the observed month, but
who had any medical doctor professional code in the
previous month and whose employer was the same as in
the last month were also classified as working doctors.
Those individuals whose professional code was missing,
but there was at least one month prior to the observed
month when the individual had medical doctor occupa-
tional code, and whose employer belonged to the health
sector were also classified as the working doctors, as well
as those persons who were working in the area of health
and who had a medical doctor occupational code
previously, and whose professional code changed to
health service manager codes.
2. Out-migrated
Those Hungarian citizens who sign on abroad have an
obligation to notify the authorities that they have left
the country, but many who out-migrate omit this duty.
First, we classified to the group of ‘out-migrated’ those
who reported their move abroad. We also wanted to
identify those who have not notified out-migration. So,
in addition, in the out-migrated group were placed all
individuals who for at least four successive months
were neither registered as employed in the database of
the Pensions Directorate, nor were signed in the
database of the Health Insurance Fund as being in
receipt of inpatient care sickness benefit, and who
during that period had received neither any other kind
of benefits (unemployment assistance, childcare pen-
sion, old age pension or other kind of pensions) nor
were they registered as studying in full time education,
or died during this period. In other words, the
classification covered those individuals who ‘disap-
peared’ from the system. The other possible reason for
the disappearance is that a person who becomes
unregistered unemployed is practically non-existent
among medical doctors in Hungary. So, it is very likely
that using the presented method we were able to
identify unnotified out-migrated quite well. Further
restrictions were placed on the process of determining
the unnotified out-migrated. Only those medical doc-
tors were signed as out-migrated who had worked as a
physician or dentist in at least three successive months
before the ‘disappearance’. Also, we did not sign those
medical doctors as out-migrated whose ‘disappear-
ance’ lasted exactly from the beginning of January
until the end of December in a given year and who had
worked in the same workplace in the months preceding
the disappearance as after the return. We assumed that
the employer failed to report the individual for the
given year to the Pensions Directorate in these cases.
At the same time in the case of some of the omitted
observations, the individuals, in fact, might enter
employment abroad on a yearly fixed-term contract.
Due to these restrictions, we give a lower bound
estimate on the out-migration. As a consequence of the
procedure of identifying the out-migrated as described
above, in the first and last three months of the
observation period, the number of out-migrated is
likely to be an underestimate, as only the notified out-
migrated could be identified in these months.
3. Exited the profession (attrition)
Those observations were classified in this way who did
not have a ‘medical doctor’ occupation code in the
observed month and who had not worked in the health
sector or did not meet other criteria qualifying them as
‘working as a doctor’.
4. Exited employment
In this group were placed the unemployed (very few
cases, unemployment is practically non-existent
among Hungarian medical doctors), those who were
in full-time education, who were on a child-care
allowance disability pension or retired.
5. Died
We had direct observations for death in our database
(in the database of the Health Insurance Found).
Methods
We analysed the out-migration decisions of doctors with the
help of time-to-event analysis. We used competing risk
models [28]. Doctors may leave the domestic health
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workforce for different reasons: out-migration, a movement
to non-health sector employment, retirement, child-care
leave, etc. A competing risk is defined as an event whose
occurrence precludes or alters the probability of occurrence
of the main event under examination. In our case, the indi-
vidual either migrates, or goes on to a job outside the health
sector, becomes inactive or unemployed or dies. Competing
risk models define separate hazard functions for each event
hk tð Þ. A cause-specific hazard hk tð Þ is the immediate risk of
failure from a particular cause (k) given that failure (from any
cause) has not happened previously
hk tð Þ ¼ lim
d!0
Pðt T\t þ d; event ¼ kjT[ tÞ
d
;
where T is the time to failure from any event. The total
hazard is the sum of the sub-hazards:
h tð Þ ¼
XK
k¼1
hkðtÞ;
where K is the number of competing events.
We used the Fine & Gray model, which is a modified
Cox proportional hazard model that allows the presence of
competing risks. The Fine & Gray model makes possible
the direct modelling of the effects of covariates on the
cumulative incidence function via a semiparametric
approach. Based on the relationship between the hazard
and survival functions, the model defines subdistribution
hazards instead of cause-specific hazards. The fundamental
difference between a cause-specific hazard and the sub-
distribution hazard is the risk set. The subdistribution
hazard, hksub (t), is the immediate risk of leaving the pro-
fession on account of a particular cause, k, given that the
subject has not left the job before as a result of cause k.
hksub tð Þ ¼ lim
d!0
P t T\t þ d; event ¼ kjT[ tð Þ or T  t&K 6¼ kð Þ
d
As in the Cox model, the Fine & Gray model for failure
is also a relative risk model that decomposes into a baseline
hazard and the regression effects of covariates:
h tjXð Þsub ¼ h0 tð Þsubexp bTsubx
 
;
where h0ðtÞsub is the baseline subdistribution hazard and
bsub is the vector of covariate effects (log subhazard ratios).
Similarly to the Cox model, the Fine & Gray model makes
no assumptions about the baseline hazard function and
assumes proportional hazards.
Based on the predictions of the competing risk model
the cause-specific cumulative incidence function, CIFk tð Þ
gives the proportion of doctors at time t who have left the
profession for a cause k, accounting for the fact that the job
can also be left for other causes:
CIFk tð Þ ¼ PðT  t; event ¼ kÞ:
The total cumulative incidence function is the sum of
cause-specific incidence functions:
CIF tð Þ ¼
XK
k¼1
CIFkðtÞ
In the analysis we distinguished four competing risk
events: (1) out-migration, (2) exits from the profession
(attrition), (3) exits from employment (related to inactivity
and unemployment), or (4) death.
We conducted the analysis for the whole sample and also
for subsamples of four age groups. The independent variables
were gender, age (in the models that used the entire sample),
dummy variables indicating whether the individual was a
general practitioner or a specialist doctor versus a dentist, and
dummy variables accounting for the region of residence. A
further variable verified the relative labour income of the
individual that is the average labour income of the person in
the preceding three months as a ratio of the average national
labour income during the same period (calculated from the
source sample). To determine whether the example of peers
strengthened out-migration decisions, we included a variable
indicating whether any medical doctors had out-migrated
during the preceding three months from the same workplace
where the individual had been working before migrating. This
covariate may also reflect the effect of the unobserved dif-
ferences in working conditions among different workplaces.
We also inserted two dummy variables into the models indi-
cating the month of Hungary’s EU accession (05.2004) and
another indicating the month (05.2011) when the transitional
period of restrictions on the free movement of labour from
EU-86 countries to Austria and Germany ended.
In order to analyse how the probability of return
migration of the out-migrated medical doctors may have
changed, a binary choice Cox proportional hazard model
(returning to the profession in Hungary or not) was used. In
the Cox model, the risk given covariates are the product of
the baseline hazard and a relative risk. In this model, the
following were included as independent variables: gender,
age group dummies and dummy variables indicating
whether the individual was a general practitioner or a
specialist doctor as opposed to a dentist.
Results
Where have all the doctors gone?
First, we present the cumulative incidence rates of the four
competing outcomes based on the models for the whole
6 EU-8 countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.
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sample (Fig. 1). These are the cumulative probabilities of
exit via each of the competing risk events: out-migration,
attrition, exiting employment, and death. The probability of
leaving the medical workforce due to death is negligible, so
we will not present detailed results for this outcome in the
following. Between January 2003 and December 2011,
12% of the practising medical doctors left the country, 17%
left the domestic health workforce and went to a job out-
side the health sector in Hungary, and about 14% became
inactive (retired, were placed on disability pension or
child-care pension or became unemployed). A part of this
group, those who were in receipt of child-care allowance
returned to healthcare some time later, the average duration
of maternity leave7 being 13 months in the sample. The
cumulative incidence functions indicate that attrition con-
tributed to doctor shortages even more than out-migration
in the observation period.
Table 1 summarises the results of the separate compet-
ing risk models for out-migration. The first column of the
table shows the results for the whole sample; columns 2–5
indicate the results for the age-group-specific subsamples.
A sub-hazard rate greater than one implies a higher prob-
ability of out-migration compared to the reference cate-
gory, while a rate of less than one indicates a lower
probability. For instance, in the model for the whole
sample (column 1), the sub-hazard rate for gender is 1.22,
indicating that the probability of out-migration of men is
22% higher than for women. Similarly, a 1% increase in
relative labour income decreased the probability of emi-
gration by 6% (the sub-hazard rate is 0.94).
For the whole sample, the results show that EU acces-
sion did not change the probability of the out-migration of
Hungarian medical doctors, but the lifting of the Austrian
and German restrictions on the free movement of labour
from EU-8 countries significantly affected the probability
of Hungarian doctors’ emigration. There might be different
explanations for this increase: historical and cultural ties
between Austria, Germany and Hungary may have had an
effect, as well as the fact of geographical closeness, but this
Fig. 1 Cumulative incidence functions: out-migration/attrition/exit from employment/death
7 Maternity leave is long in Hungary. New parents are entitled to
3 years of maternity leave during which they cannot be dismissed.
Maternity leave qualifies the person taking it to other benefits,
including pensions.
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question needs further research. For the whole sample,
there was a more than fivefold increase in the probability of
out-migration in May 2011. The results of the age-specific
subsamples show that EU accession affected the proba-
bility of out-migration for none of the age groups, but the
effect of the lifting the Austrian and German restrictions
was significant for all age groups. The increase in the
probability of out-migration was larger for the young.
There was a more than a sevenfold increase for medical
doctors under 31, and more than sixfold for physicians and
dentists in the 31–40 age bracket. Nevertheless, the prob-
ability of out-migration of physicians and dentists even in
the 41–50 range increased fourfold. The effect was zero
and the zero effect was significant. In the 31–40 age group,
there was a significantly higher probability of men out-
migrating than for women. Among the 51- to 60-year-olds,
the probability of out-migration was greater for women
than men doctors. In the other age groups, there were no
significant differences in the probability of out-migration
by gender. Relative labour income exercised a significant
effect on the out-migration decisions of young medical
doctors, namely those under 31 years old, as was also the
case for the 31- to 40-year-olds. In these age groups, the
lower the relative income of the medical doctor, the larger
is the probability of out-migration. For the 31- to 40-year-
olds, peer pressure also plays a significant role. Medical
doctors move abroad with greater probability if any med-
ical doctors from the same workplace had out-migrated
during the preceding 3 months. This might reflect the
effects of ‘‘peer pressure’’ or chain migration, but it could
also be the consequence of deteriorating working condi-
tions in the given workplace resulting from understaffing
on account of out-migration. This question also needs
further research. General practitioners also move elsewhere
with higher probability than the reference group (dentists).
Regional differences are not typical in the probability of
out-migration.
Changes in the dynamics of the probability of out-mi-
gration in the observed period can be traced with the help
of the cumulative incidence functions. Figure 2 shows the
cumulative incidence functions of out-migration for the
different age groups as predicted by the competing risk
models.
Between 2003 and 2012 more than 14% of 31- to
40-year-old Hungarian medical doctors and dentists left
Hungary, 12% of those younger than 31, and 14% even of
those in the 51–60 age group. The group of doctors aged
41–50 shows the lowest rates. Immediately upon EU
accession, doctors of the oldest age group, 51–60 years,
left the country at the fastest pace, probably because they
could take advantage of their previous professional con-
tacts in finding suitable jobs. After that, until March 2010,
the outflow of the 51–60 age group stopped. In the case of
the other age groups, there was a steady outflow until
March 2010: by that date, 8% of the 31- to 40-year-olds,
6% of those younger than 31, and only 3% of those in the
41–50 age group went abroad. It was not, however, only
the end of the transitional period (May 2011) of restrictions
Table 1 Competing risk models (subhazard rates) — out-migration (competing risks: attrition/exit from employment/death)
Variable Subhazard rates
The whole sample \31 years old 31–40 years old 41–50 years old 51–60 years old
Gender (male = 1) 1.22a (0.058) 1.37 (0.164) 1.49a (0.133) 1.21 (0.130) 0.76b (0.070)
Age 0.99a (0.002) – – – –
General practitioner 1.33a (0.076) 2.17a (0.309) 1.86a (0.182) 1.39 (0.225) 0.82 (0.123)
Specialist doctor 1.04 (0.060) 0.98 (0.245) 1.62a (0.163) 1.21 (0.141) 0.83 (0.079)
Relative labour income 0.93a (0.027) 0.46a (0.074) 0.68a (0.062) 0.90 (0.062) 1.04 (0.036)
Peer effect 1.15 (0.063) 0.76 (0.098) 1.37a (0.130) 1.34 (0.178) 1.00 (0.117)
Region: Central Transdanubia 1.41a (0.152) 1.45 (0.572) 1.53 (0.279) 1.30 (0.299) 1.43 (0.267)
Region: Western Transdanubia 0.85 (0.116) 0.99 (0.449) 0.63 (0.171) 1.01 (0.265) 1.02 (0.227)
Region: Southern Transdanubia 0.52b (0.120) 0.31 (0.316) 0.67 (0.220) 0 (0) 0.78 (0.294)
Region: Northern Hungary 0.75 (0.094) 0.40 (0.235) 0.90 (0.179) 0.52 (0.161) 0.86 (0.188)
Region: Northern Great Plain 1.08 (0.109) 2.33a (0.581) 0.82 (0.151) 1.08 (0.223) 0.85 (0.178)
Region: Southern Great Plain 0.89 (0.136) 1.42 (0.578) 0.67 (0.193) 1.17 (0.332) 0.86 (0.248)
EU accession (May 2004) 0.51 (0.159) 0.00 (0) 0.27 (0.169) 0.32 (0.199) 0.34 (0.161)
Lifting of temporary restrictions (May 2011) 5.75a (1.029) 7.65a (3.069) 6.72a (2.330) 4.04b (1.848) 0.00a (0)
Standard errors in parentheses
Reference category: female; dentist; Central Hungary; month other than 05.2004; month other than 05.2013
a Significant at the 1% level
b Significant at the 5% level
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on the free movement of labour from EU-8 countries to
Austria and Germany that increased the probability of out-
migration of medical doctors of all age groups: another
turning point may be observed in March 2010. There are
several possible explanations for this sudden change. It
might be the effect of the economic crisis or the forecast
results of the upcoming general elections in Hungary in
April 2010 that might have contributed to that change. In
fact, in March 2010, the rise in the outflow was higher than
the increase in May 2011. After March 2010, the proba-
bility of out-migration rose steeply not only for the younger
medical doctors but also for the 41- to 50-year-olds as well.
The rise of out-migration after March 2010 may highlight
that not only the pull factors play a decisive role in out-
migration decisions, but the push factors might be equally
important in these decisions. The results of the competing
risk models for the attrition of medical doctors in Hungary
during the same period confirm this explanation.
Figure 3 presents the cumulative incidence functions of
attrition for the different age groups. In the examined period,
a larger fraction of young doctors left the health sector than
that of the older age groups. Eighteen per cent of physicians
and dentists younger than 31 years old and 20% of medical
doctors aged 31–40 left their profession and took up another
job in Hungary. During the same period, 14% of both the
41–50 and 51- to 60-year-old doctors also left the job. In all
age groups, a larger proportion of doctors found a job outside
the health sector in Hungary than that which out-migrated.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the separate com-
peting risk models of attrition. There are no gender dif-
ferences in the probability of attrition in the whole sample,
and for the different age groups, but for the 31- to 40-year-
olds. In this age group, women go to a job outside the
health sector with a significantly larger probability than do
men. The probability of general practitioners and specialist
doctors leaving the profession is smaller than in the case of
dentists. Relative labour income also has a significant
effect on the probability of attrition for the whole sample as
well as for all of the age groups. The larger the relative
income of a medical doctor, the larger the probability is
that she/he will go to a job outside the health sector even if
we control for age, gender, and the other explanatory
variables. This larger income is probably in large measure
the result of more overtime and night duty work. Medical
Fig. 2 Cumulative incidence functions — out-migration of medical doctors by age groups
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doctors who choose to work additional night and weekend
shifts to increase their salary or who are better paid for
other reasons stand a greater probability of leaving the
profession. It seems that demanding working conditions
play a decisive role in attrition decisions. For older doctors
there might also be other considerations for leaving the
profession. Official pay in the Hungarian health sector is
low, and even declined during the crisis. Medical doctors
earn significantly less than graduates with a similar edu-
cation and of similar age employed in industry. Although
actual labour income including ‘‘thank-you money’’ is
necessarily higher than customary pay, this extra pay varies
widely with age, rank and field of practice [25]. Younger
doctors usually get small amounts of ‘‘thank-you money’’,
while older doctors get much more, but they include only a
part of the real amount of such payments in their tax
statements. In Hungary, there is a uniform, mandatory,
earnings-related public pension system and the hidden
income is naturally not counted in the income of the
individual when the earnings-related pension is calculated.
The desire to increase their legal income before retirement
may harden the attrition decisions of older doctors.
To obtain a fuller picture of the determinants of attri-
tion it is worth summarizing labour income gains of
former doctors and looking at where former medical
doctors work after having left the medical workforce.
Table 3 shows the average monthly labour income gains
of former doctors in the 1st month after they left the
profession and the income benefit as a percent of current
physicians’ employment income (in December 2011 pri-
ces). The revenue gains resulting from job changes are
rather high. On average, those medical doctors who left
the profession enjoyed a 40% higher labour income than
before the change in job. The employment income gain
was greater for the older physicians or dentists. On
average, the pay increase attributable to attrition was
about 52% for the 50- to 60-year-olds and about 30% for
the youngest doctors.
Table 4 summarizes the distribution of former medical
doctors who are working outside the health sector by sector
of employment, and Table 5 by occupation groups after
they leave the health sector. A quarter of former doctors
find a job in education and research. These jobs are very
likely to be connected to their physician qualification, as
Fig. 3 Cumulative incidence functions — attrition of medical doctors by age groups
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are, more or less, the jobs in sectors related to pharma-
ceutical commerce, where 35% of former doctors work.
About 40% of former doctors, however, find jobs outside
the health sector. Very similar patterns can be observed in
the distribution by occupations of former medical doctors.
About 42% of them go to another job that is not connected
with their qualification (Table 5).
Besides out-migration and attrition, leaving employment
also contributes — at least temporarily — to the growing
shortage of medical doctors in Hungary. The majority of
medical doctors who became inactive during the examined
period did so not primarily as a result of retirement, but
were chiefly woman medical doctors who were on mater-
nity leave for a while (see Appendix 2 Table 8; Fig. 5).
Although women doctors return to practice on average
about a year later, the growing feminization of the pro-
fession may enhance the effect of these absences on
medical doctor shortages.
Return migration
Some of the medical doctors who had left the country
during the observation period returned some time later.
Figure 4 shows the empirical Kaplan–Meier survival
functions which represent the survival times abroad, that is,
the proportion of out-migrated medical doctors who are
still working abroad a certain amount of time after out-
Table 2 Competing risk models (subhazard rates) — attrition (competing risks: out-migration/exit from employment/death)
Variable Subhazard rates
The whole sample \30 years old 31–40 years old 41–50 years old 51–60 years old
Gender (male = 1) 0.89 (0.036) 0.77 (0.083) 0.67a (0.049) 0.98 (0.077) 0.96 (0.081)
Age 0.99a (0.002) –
General practitioner 0.64a (0.034) 0.59a (0.061) 0.73a (0.065) 0.53a (0.071) 0.41a (0.071)
Specialist doctor 0.62a (0.027) 0.61 (0.120) 0.71a (0.057) 0.48a (0.038) 0.64a (0.055)
Relative labour income 1.12a (0.014) 1.56a (0.085) 1.18a (0.030) 1.15a (0.027) 1.10a (0.016)
Peer effect 0.97 (0.048) 1.35b (0.143) 0.70a (0.068) 0.87 (0.090) 0.97 (0.111)
Region: Central Transdanubia 0.97 (0.100) 0.83 (0.254) 0.96 (0.169) 0.80 (0.162) 1.10 (0.220)
Region: Western Transdanubia 1.07 (0.110) 0.91 (0.286) 1.13 (0.202) 0.82 (0.171) 1.50 (0.266)
Region: Southern Transdanubia 0.69 (0.114) 0.45 (0.261) 0.85 (0.225) 0.73 (0.202) 0.54 (0.213)
Region: Northern Hungary 0.75 (0.079) 0.95 (0.242) 0.68 (0.134) 0.59 (0.122) 1.08 (0.203)
Region: Northern Great Plain 0.94 (0.085) 0.73 (0.212) 0.94 (0.150) 0.95 (0.155) 1.06 (0.192)
Region: Southern Great Plain 0.90 (0.112) 1.09 (0.347) 1.10 (0.215) 0.64 (0.161) 1.10 (0.264)
EU accession (May 2004) 0.44 (0.114) 0.82 (0.335) 0.43 (0.156) 0.48 (0.268) 0 (0)
Lifting of temporary restrictions (May 2011) 4.85 (0.752) 0 (0) 6.47b (2.668) 1.06 (0.090) 9.63 (6.774)
Standard errors in parentheses
Reference category: female; dentist; Central Hungary; month other than 05.2004; month other than 05.2013
a Significant at the 1% level
b Significant at the 5% level
Table 3 Average monthly
labour income gain of
Hungarian medical doctors in
the 1st month after attrition
Age group Average monthly labour income gain
thousands HUF (in 2011 prices)
Average labour income gains as a % of
average labour income of medical doctors
\30 years old 63,553 30.4
31–40 years old 68,137 26.9
41–50 years old 109,136 38.8
51–60 years old 158,226 51.8
Total 109,583 39.9
Table 4 Distribution of former medical doctors by sector of
employment after attrition (percent)
Sector Percent
Sectors related to pharmaceutical commerce 35.0
Education and research 25.0
Other sectors 40.0
Total 100
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migration. The figure shows the Kaplan–Meier curves for
the entire sample and also the curves by gender, by age
group and by the specialisation of the medical doctors.
Among medical doctors who left the country between
January 2001 and December 2011, the average duration of
working abroad was 54 months. In the case of the youngest
doctors, those younger than 31 years old, the duration of
their work abroad was the shortest, on average 42 months.
For the 31- to 40-year-olds and the 41–50 age-group the
average duration was 59 months, and for the 51–60
bracket, 53 months. A possible explanation of why the
youngest doctors spent the shortest time in their foreign
jobs and why the greatest proportion of them returned to
the Hungarian health sector is that the majority of them left
the country for educational opportunities and then they
returned home after finishing their studies. Of the 41- to
50-year-old out-migrated doctors, about 60% were still
working abroad after 108 months, and so were about 45%
of the 31- to 40-year-olds and 40% of the 51- to 60-year old
doctors. Those doctors might be considered permanently
out-migrated who are not likely to return to the Hungarian
health sector. The figure for the whole sample and the
gender- and specialisation-specific curves show that the
unconditional exit rate from the foreign job was quite
steady between the 1st and 48th months, then between the
49th and 50th month there was a sudden increase in the exit
rate, and thereafter the exit rate slowed down. The exit
rates by gender show that the difference in the exit rates
was small between the 1st and 50th months. At that point
and beyond, a larger proportion of women left their foreign
jobs than did men. The curves by age groups provide an
explanation for this. It was the oldest age group, the 51- to
60-year-olds whose exit rate accelerated significantly
Table 5 Distribution of former medical doctors by occupation after
attrition (percent)
Occupation group Percent
Managerial jobs outside the health sector 18.5
Occupations related to pharmaceuticals 20.7
Occupations related to pharmaceutical commerce 18.5
Other occupations outside the health sector 42.3
Total 100
Fig. 4 Return migration of out-migrated medical doctors — Kaplan–Meier survival functions
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around the 50th month. It is very likely that a large pro-
portion of medical doctors attaining retirement age return
home and work for a while in the Hungarian health sector.
Table 6 presents the results of the Cox proportional
hazard model of return migration. Being male decreases
the probability of return migration by 20%, as compared to
that for women. The older the out-migrated doctor is, the
smaller is the probability that he/she will return. The haz-
ard of return migration is 97% smaller for general practi-
tioners and 99% smaller for specialist doctors than for
dentists. There is a 46% higher probability of the youngest
doctors returning home than their counterparts in the other
age groups, and there is no significant difference in the
probability of leaving the foreign job comparing 31–40,
40–50 and 51- to 60-year-old medical doctors.
A number of the returning medical doctors may out-mi-
grate again at a later date. In our sample, 90% of the out-
migrated doctors took a job abroad once during the observed
108 months and only the remaining 10% out-migrated twice
or more during this period. Our results show that about half of
the out-migrated doctors are permanent migrants.
Conclusions
The enlargement of the EU amplified concerns in the new
member states that the increased job-opportunities for
doctors in other countries within the EU offering attractive
working conditions would lead to increasing shortages of
doctors in the new member states, and thus have an adverse
effect on the health systems of these countries. Neverthe-
less, discussion of the effect of EU enlargement on the
labour migration of medical doctors is severely hindered by
the lack of comprehensive data which would allow a more
accurate monitoring of health labour migration.
The main contribution of this study to existing research
is that we were able to exploit a large, linked, individual-
level, administrative panel dataset in order to analyse
changes in the dynamics of migration of Hungarian med-
ical doctors between 2003 and 2011 on a monthly basis.
Panel data have a greater capacity for capturing the com-
plexity of migration processes than a simple cross-section
database. The most significant advantage of panel data is
the possibility of being able to track individuals over time.
We were able to observe how much time the status (e.g.
actually working as a doctor) of a particular medical doctor
lasted, in which period they changed their labour market
status (including migration), and also observe the return
migration of medical doctors. Data on the return migration
of medical doctors are even less complete, a fact further
hampered by the dynamic and complex nature of migration
itself. An additional advantage of our database was the
length of the observation period, 9 years, that is,
108 months. The period included months before and after
EU accession, and months before and after Austria and
Germany lifted restrictions on the free movement of labour
from new member states. As our sample was based on
administrative data, we did not have to face the potential
attrition bias which is a common problem with panel data,
that is, cases when some observations from the baseline
period are missing in the follow-up periods, and we were
also able to use this characteristic of our sample to identify
migration. Nevertheless, administrative data has not only
benefits, but limitations too. Administrative data systems
are not designed for statistical purposes or scientific
research, and they collect information only for their
specific purposes, so we had only a limited number of
control variables. For instance, we had no data on the
specialisations of specialist doctors, or the family status of
medical doctors, which also might have had an effect on
migration decisions. Our data did not capture those cases of
the mobility of medical doctors when they take up short-
term contracts and participate in the systems of two
countries, i.e. those who work abroad, but do so on a part-
time basis while also being employed in Hungary. Our
results apply only to those medical doctors who had left the
Hungarian health system and worked abroad.
The results of this study show that EU accession did not
affect the out-migration of Hungarian physicians and
dentists, but after Austria and Germany lifted the tempo-
rary restrictions towards workers from the new EU member
states in May 2011, the migration of medical doctors
increased considerably. We also found that push factors
have as great a role in the out-migration decisions of
Hungarian physicians and dentists as pull factors. Medical
healthcare shortages are not only due to high outward
migration but to other problems in the Hungarian health
system: attrition and feminization. Outward migration
Table 6 Return migration of out-migrated medical doctors — Cox
proportional hazard model
Variable Hazard rate
Male 0.82a (0.041)
\31 years old 1.46a (0.104)
31–40 years old 1.14 (0.082)
41–60 years old 1.06 (0.083)
General practitioner 0.04a (0.008)
Specialist doctor 0.02a (0.005)
Number of observations: 187,195
Number of subjects: 2749
No. of failures: 1713
Time at risk: 187,195
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Reference group: female; dentist, 41–50 years old
a Significant at the 1% level
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plays an important and growing role in the shortages. The
scale of return migration is also considerable. The Hun-
garian health system can gain from out-migration, how-
ever, only if the returning medical doctors can put their
increased skills and knowledge to use. If attrition and out-
migration continue at the same pace as hitherto, and the
facilities remain understaffed, a decrease in the quality of
care will be difficult to stop.
Although our research used a specific Hungarian data set,
it seems likely that some of these findings would be similar
in other EU-10 countries. The results of several case studies
and summaries of PROMeTHEUS and MoHProf projects
show that in most of the EU-10 countries the migration of
health professionals had already started well before those
countries’ EU accessions [12, 21] due to the political tran-
sition in the 1990s, and that post-accession outflows from
the EU10 have been lower than expected. It seems that in
other EU-10 countries, too, shortages of medical doctors are
due not only to high outward migration, but also to other
problems in the health system, such as attrition. Neverthe-
less, we cannot assess how the dynamics of the migration of
medical doctors has changed in these countries because of
the lack of detailed and comparable data on outflows and
inflows. There are attempts in some EU countries to collect
detailed survey data regularly on the emigration of medical
doctors and return migration, e.g. Iceland [29]. To create a
comparable, detailed register of such migration in EU
countries, or the regular monitoring of this migration in the
EU with large-scale surveys might help us better understand
the dynamic nature of migration and assist in the adoption of
adequate policy measures.
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Appendix 1
See Table 7.
Table 7 Summary statistics
Variable The whole sample \30 years old 31–40 years old 41–50 years old 51–60 years old
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Male 0.45 0.497 0.39 0.487 0.45 0.497 0.43 0.494 0.45 0.497
Age 43.38 13.450 – – – – – – – –
General practitioner 0.17 0.373 0.30 0.458 0.20 0.403 0.11 0.312 0.11 0.309
Specialist doctor 0.33 0.471 0.05 0.211 0.31 0.463 0.51 0.500 0.47 0.499
Dentist 0.07 0.247 0.05 0.227 0.09 0.284 0.07 0.252 0.06 0.241
Relative labour income 1.66 1.255 1.34 0.801 1.63 1.214 1.80 1.346 1.87 1.311
Peer effect 0.24 0.429 0.42 0.494 0.25 0.434 0.20 0.399 0.2 0.403
Region: Central Hungary 0.23 0.422 0.10 0.306 0.26 0.441 0.27 0.443 0.3 0.46
Region: Central
Transdanubia
0.03 0.181 0.02 0.126 0.04 0.203 0.04 0.198 0.04 0.201
Region: Western
Transdanubia
0.03 0.175 0.01 0.116 0.04 0.184 0.04 0.197 0.04 0.202
Region: Southern
Transdanubia
0.02 0.129 0.01 0.094 0.02 0.142 0.02 0.148 0.02 0.131
Region: Northern Hungary 0.04 0.196 0.02 0.148 0.04 0.205 0.05 0.226 0.05 0.216
Region: Northern Great Plain 0.05 0.213 0.02 0.149 0.06 0.239 0.06 0.240 0.05 0.224
Region: Southern Great Plain 0.02 0.152 0.01 0.110 0.03 0.170 0.03 0.174 0.03 0.163
EU accession (May 2004) 0.01 0.097 0.01 0.112 0.01 0.096 0.01 0.098 0.01 0.09
Lifting of temporary
restrictions (May 2011)
0.01 0.097 0.01 0.071 0.01 0.098 0.01 0.096 0.01 0.102
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Appendix 2
See Fig. 5 and Table 8.
Fig. 5 Cumulative incidence functions — exit from employment of medical doctors by age groups and gender
Table 8 Competing risk models (subhazard rates) — exit from employment (competing risks: out-migration/attrition/death)
Variable Subhazard rates
The whole sample \30 years old 31–40 years old 41–50 years old 51–60 years old
Gender (male = 1) 0.36a (0.018) 0.118a (0.020) 0.08a (0.010) 0.41a (0.072) 0.59a (0.053)
Age 1.00 (0.003) – – – –
General practitioner 1.62a (0.086) 1.835a (0.222) 1.96a (0.173) 2.79 a (0.545) 0.95 (0.129)
Specialist doctor 0.98 (0.055) 1.565 (0.278) 1.69a (0.153) 1.15 (0.196) 0.92 (0.086)
Relative labour income 0.74a (0.047) 0.157a (0.021) 0.38a (0.045) 1.16a (0.043) 0.98 (0.081)
Peer effect 1.31a (0.074) 1.199 (0.131) 1.48a (0.127) 1.08 (0.216) 0.72 (0.093)
Region: Central Transdanubia 1.01 (0.105) 1.732 (0.374) 0.88 (0.159) 0.88 (0.336) 0.81 (0.178)
Region: Western Transdanubia 0.91 (0.101) 1.148 (0.269) 1.03 (0.196) 0.40 (0.233) 0.90 (0.200)
Region: Southern Transdanubia 0.69 (0.112) 1.042 (0.274) 0.83 (0.204) 0.21 (0.215) 0.82 (0.297)
Region: Northern Hungary 0.83 (0.084) 1.259 (0.232) 0.97 (0.165) 0.34 (0.173) 1.06 (0.197)
Region: Northern Great Plain 1.02 (0.089) 0.758 (0.161) 1.05 (0.150) 1.04 (0.308) 1.24 (0.211)
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